| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: add upper bound check on user inputs in signal ioctl
Huge input values in amdgpu_userq_signal_ioctl can lead to a OOM and
could be exploited.
So check these input value against AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES
which is big enough value for genuine use cases and could
potentially avoid OOM.
(cherry picked from commit be267e15f99bc97cbe202cd556717797cdcf79a5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix divide-by-zero in tipc_sk_filter_connect()
A user can set conn_timeout to any value via
setsockopt(TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT), including values less than 4. When a
SYN is rejected with TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD and the retry path in
tipc_sk_filter_connect() executes:
delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout / 4);
If conn_timeout is in the range [0, 3], the integer division yields 0,
and the modulo operation triggers a divide-by-zero exception, causing a
kernel oops/panic.
Fix this by clamping conn_timeout to a minimum of 4 at the point of use
in tipc_sk_filter_connect().
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: poc-F144 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+
RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_filter_rcv (net/tipc/socket.c:2236 net/tipc/socket.c:2362)
Call Trace:
tipc_sk_backlog_rcv (include/linux/instrumented.h:82 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 include/net/sock.h:2357 net/tipc/socket.c:2406)
__release_sock (include/net/sock.h:1185 net/core/sock.c:3213)
release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3797)
tipc_connect (net/tipc/socket.c:2570)
__sys_connect (include/linux/file.h:62 include/linux/file.h:83 net/socket.c:2098) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as
a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer
contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte
buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.
Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header
fields to guard against undersized messages.
Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.
In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a
remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len
against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed
integer overflow on offset.
Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after
skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline
KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on
a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode
block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an
adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk
id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a
corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data
capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.
Call trace (crash path):
vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
do_splice_direct
splice_direct_to_actor
iter_file_splice_write
ocfs2_file_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ocfs2_write_end
ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
alongside the existing i_size check to fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If
the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual
inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data
buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from
freed memory.
In the syzbot report:
- i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
- Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
- A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
- This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure
inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from
operating on invalid data. |
| Ledger Nano X, Flex, and Stax devices contain a denial of service vulnerability in the MCU firmware update process due to missing validation of the reset_handler parameter during firmware flashing. An attacker can provide a crafted reset_handler address pointing to invalid memory or attacker-controlled code to cause the device to enter an unrecoverable fault state during boot, resulting in permanent loss of operability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: validate MTU against usable frame size on bind
AF_XDP bind currently accepts zero-copy pool configurations without
verifying that the device MTU fits into the usable frame space provided
by the UMEM chunk.
This becomes a problem since we started to respect tailroom which is
subtracted from chunk_size (among with headroom). 2k chunk size might
not provide enough space for standard 1500 MTU, so let us catch such
settings at bind time. Furthermore, validate whether underlying HW will
be able to satisfy configured MTU wrt XSK's frame size multiplied by
supported Rx buffer chain length (that is exposed via
net_device::xdp_zc_max_segs). |
| A data corruption vulnerability has been identified in the luksmeta utility when used with the LUKS1 disk encryption format. An attacker with the necessary permissions can exploit this flaw by writing a large amount of metadata to an encrypted device. The utility fails to correctly validate the available space, causing the metadata to overwrite and corrupt the user's encrypted data. This action leads to a permanent loss of the stored information. Devices using the LUKS formats other than LUKS1 are not affected by this issue. |
| This affects versions of the package exifreader before 4.39.0. A crafted image containing an ICC mluc tag can set an attacker-controlled record count together with a zero record size. During parsing, ExifReader repeatedly processes the same record and appends entries to an array without sufficient bounds validation, causing excessive memory growth. In applications that parse attacker-supplied images, this may lead to denial of service through memory exhaustion. |
| Insufficient parameter sanitization in TEE SOC Driver could allow an attacker to issue a malformed DRV_SOC_CMD_ID_SRIOV_COPY_VF_CHIPLET_REGS to write invalid data to a remote Die, potentially resulting in unexpected behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an
under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared
`ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;
The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds;
it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable.
An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare
ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at
offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header +
4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also
reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448);
smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL
on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel
walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the
OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the
attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are
possible. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.5 before 18.9.7, 18.10 before 18.10.6, and 18.11 before 18.11.3 that could have allowed an unauthenticated user to cause denial of service by sending specially crafted payloads on certain API endpoints. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.2, Vvveb CMS does not validate the sign of the quantity parameter on the cart-add endpoint. Submitting a negative integer is accepted by the server and treated as a normal positive line-item, but with the sign carried through into every downstream computation: line total, sub-total, taxes, and grand total all become negative numbers. The customer-facing cart UI then displays a negative grand total to the user, the checkout flow accepts the negative cart, and the resulting order is persisted in the merchant's database with a negative total column. From the merchant's order management dashboard, this surfaces as a real order with a negative total — an "the merchant owes the customer money" record that no legitimate workflow ever creates. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.2. |
| Insufficient parameter sanitization in TEE SOC Driver could allow an attacker to issue a malformed DRV_SOC_CMD_ID_SRIOV_CHECK_TA_COMPAT to cause incorrect shared memory mapping, potentially resulting in unexpected behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into
a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane
length.
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key
with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE
has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller
than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled
elsewhere anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix interlaced plain identification for encoded extents
Only plain data whose start position and on-disk physical length are
both aligned to the block size should be classified as interlaced
plain extents. Otherwise, it must be treated as shifted plain extents.
This issue was found by syzbot using a crafted compressed image
containing plain extents with unaligned physical lengths, which can
cause OOB read in z_erofs_transform_plain(). |
| Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.18, improper validation of the JWT NumericDate claims exp, nbf, and iat in hono/utils/jwt allows tokens with non-spec-compliant claim values to silently bypass time-based checks. This issue is not exploitable by an anonymous attacker; it only manifests when a malformed claim value reaches verify() — typically when the application itself issues such tokens, or when the signing key is otherwise under attacker control. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.18. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix missing key size check for L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ
This adds a check for encryption key size upon receiving
L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ which is required by L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-15-C which
expects L2CAP_CR_LE_BAD_KEY_SIZE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
enic: Validate length of nl attributes in enic_set_vf_port
enic_set_vf_port assumes that the nl attribute IFLA_PORT_PROFILE
is of length PORT_PROFILE_MAX and that the nl attributes
IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID, IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID are of length PORT_UUID_MAX.
These attributes are validated (in the function do_setlink in rtnetlink.c)
using the nla_policy ifla_port_policy. The policy defines IFLA_PORT_PROFILE
as NLA_STRING, IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID as NLA_BINARY and
IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID as NLA_STRING. That means that the length validation
using the policy is for the max size of the attributes and not on exact
size so the length of these attributes might be less than the sizes that
enic_set_vf_port expects. This might cause an out of bands
read access in the memcpys of the data of these
attributes in enic_set_vf_port. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
Check user input length before copying data. |
