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Search Results (18632 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-24207 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Triton Inference Server | 2026-05-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| NVIDIA Triton Inference Server contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an authentication bypass. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, denial of service, or information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31416 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nfnetlink_log: account for netlink header size This is a followup to an old bug fix: NLMSG_DONE needs to account for the netlink header size, not just the attribute size. This can result in a WARN splat + drop of the netlink message, but other than this there are no ill effects. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24208 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Triton Inference Server | 2026-05-20 | 5.3 Medium |
| NVIDIA Triton Inference Server contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a path traversal issue. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24209 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Triton Inference Server | 2026-05-20 | 7.5 High |
| NVIDIA Triton Inference Server contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a path traversal issue. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24210 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Triton Inference Server | 2026-05-20 | 7.5 High |
| NVIDIA Triton Inference Server contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an integer overflow. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31414 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: use expect->helper Use expect->helper in ctnetlink and /proc to dump the helper name. Using nfct_help() without holding a reference to the master conntrack is unsafe. Use exp->master->helper in ctnetlink path if userspace does not provide an explicit helper when creating an expectation to retain the existing behaviour. The ctnetlink expectation path holds the reference on the master conntrack and nf_conntrack_expect lock and the nfnetlink glue path refers to the master ct that is attached to the skb. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31406 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: Fix work re-schedule after cancel in xfrm_nat_keepalive_net_fini() After cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called from xfrm_nat_keepalive_net_fini(), xfrm_state_fini() flushes remaining states via __xfrm_state_delete(), which calls xfrm_nat_keepalive_state_updated() to re-schedule nat_keepalive_work. The following is a simple race scenario: cpu0 cpu1 cleanup_net() [Round 1] ops_undo_list() xfrm_net_exit() xfrm_nat_keepalive_net_fini() cancel_delayed_work_sync(nat_keepalive_work); xfrm_state_fini() xfrm_state_flush() xfrm_state_delete(x) __xfrm_state_delete(x) xfrm_nat_keepalive_state_updated(x) schedule_delayed_work(nat_keepalive_work); rcu_barrier(); net_complete_free(); net_passive_dec(net); llist_add(&net->defer_free_list, &defer_free_list); cleanup_net() [Round 2] rcu_barrier(); net_complete_free() kmem_cache_free(net_cachep, net); nat_keepalive_work() // on freed net To prevent this, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is replaced with disable_delayed_work_sync(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-31407 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: add missing netlink policy validations Hyunwoo Kim reports out-of-bounds access in sctp and ctnetlink. These attributes are used by the kernel without any validation. Extend the netlink policies accordingly. Quoting the reporter: nlattr_to_sctp() assigns the user-supplied CTA_PROTOINFO_SCTP_STATE value directly to ct->proto.sctp.state without checking that it is within the valid range. [..] and: ... with exp->dir = 100, the access at ct->master->tuplehash[100] reads 5600 bytes past the start of a 320-byte nf_conn object, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read confirmed by UBSAN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31408 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: Fix use-after-free in sco_recv_frame() due to missing sock_hold sco_recv_frame() reads conn->sk under sco_conn_lock() but immediately releases the lock without holding a reference to the socket. A concurrent close() can free the socket between the lock release and the subsequent sk->sk_state access, resulting in a use-after-free. Other functions in the same file (sco_sock_timeout(), sco_conn_del()) correctly use sco_sock_hold() to safely hold a reference under the lock. Fix by using sco_sock_hold() to take a reference before releasing the lock, and adding sock_put() on all exit paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31409 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: unset conn->binding on failed binding request When a multichannel SMB2_SESSION_SETUP request with SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING fails ksmbd sets conn->binding = true but never clears it on the error path. This leaves the connection in a binding state where all subsequent ksmbd_session_lookup_all() calls fall back to the global sessions table. This fix it by clearing conn->binding = false in the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31410 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: use volume UUID in FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION Use sb->s_uuid for a proper volume identifier as the primary choice. For filesystems that do not provide a UUID, fall back to stfs.f_fsid obtained from vfs_statfs(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43493 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests MAY_BACKLOG requests can return EBUSY. Handle them by checking for that value and filtering out EINPROGRESS notifications. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43481 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net-shapers: don't free reply skb after genlmsg_reply() genlmsg_reply() hands the reply skb to netlink, and netlink_unicast() consumes it on all return paths, whether the skb is queued successfully or freed on an error path. net_shaper_nl_get_doit() and net_shaper_nl_cap_get_doit() currently jump to free_msg after genlmsg_reply() fails and call nlmsg_free(msg), which can hit the same skb twice. Return the genlmsg_reply() error directly and keep free_msg only for pre-reply failures. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43380 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/q54sj108a2) fix stack overflow in debugfs read The q54sj108a2_debugfs_read function suffers from a stack buffer overflow due to incorrect arguments passed to bin2hex(). The function currently passes 'data' as the destination and 'data_char' as the source. Because bin2hex() converts each input byte into two hex characters, a 32-byte block read results in 64 bytes of output. Since 'data' is only 34 bytes (I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2), this writes 30 bytes past the end of the buffer onto the stack. Additionally, the arguments were swapped: it was reading from the zero-initialized 'data_char' and writing to 'data', resulting in all-zero output regardless of the actual I2C read. Fix this by: 1. Expanding 'data_char' to 66 bytes to safely hold the hex output. 2. Correcting the bin2hex() argument order and using the actual read count. 3. Using a pointer to select the correct output buffer for the final simple_read_from_buffer call. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43378 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: server: fix use-after-free in smb2_open() The opinfo pointer obtained via rcu_dereference(fp->f_opinfo) is dereferenced after rcu_read_unlock(), creating a use-after-free window. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31411 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() Reproducer available at [1]. The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged: int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL); // become ATM signaling daemon struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... }; *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef; // fake vcc pointer sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(), or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values. Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found. Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to keep the vcc alive while it is being used. Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns. However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race only affects the logical state, not memory safety. [1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3 | ||||
| CVE-2026-31412 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks() The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow. Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables. So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses. Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31413 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix unsound scalar forking in maybe_fork_scalars() for BPF_OR maybe_fork_scalars() is called for both BPF_AND and BPF_OR when the source operand is a constant. When dst has signed range [-1, 0], it forks the verifier state: the pushed path gets dst = 0, the current path gets dst = -1. For BPF_AND this is correct: 0 & K == 0. For BPF_OR this is wrong: 0 | K == K, not 0. The pushed path therefore tracks dst as 0 when the runtime value is K, producing an exploitable verifier/runtime divergence that allows out-of-bounds map access. Fix this by passing env->insn_idx (instead of env->insn_idx + 1) to push_stack(), so the pushed path re-executes the ALU instruction with dst = 0 and naturally computes the correct result for any opcode. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31415 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl() Yiming Qian reported : <quote> I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()` (local DoS). The core issue is a mismatch between: - a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type `__u16`) and - a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`) when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided. - `include/net/ipv6.h`: - `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298) - `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`: - Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen` without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`: - Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`: - Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) - `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`: - Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211) 1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator: - `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`. 2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs and increments `opt_flen` each time: - In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`: - It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);` - It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922) - Then it does: - `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927) - `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928) There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy `IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at `net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`). If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header. In the attached PoC (`poc.c`): - 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048` - 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8` - Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8` - The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header. 3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`: - In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`: - `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;` With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later. 4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from `dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`: - In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`: - `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);` - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes `dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`. - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does: - `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));` - `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));` With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers `skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`: - `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`) - `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`) - The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`). - Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user namespaces. - An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this). - Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-23461 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_unregister_user After commit ab4eedb790ca ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix corrupted list in hci_chan_del"), l2cap_conn_del() uses conn->lock to protect access to conn->users. However, l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user() don't use conn->lock, creating a race condition where these functions can access conn->users and conn->hchan concurrently with l2cap_conn_del(). This can lead to use-after-free and list corruption bugs, as reported by syzbot. Fix this by changing l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user() to use conn->lock instead of hci_dev_lock(), ensuring consistent locking for the l2cap_conn structure. | ||||